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Coalition formation with border carbon adjustment
Schopf, Mark - 2020
The present paper analyzes the impact of a climate coalition's border carbon adjustment on emissions from commodity … production, welfare and the coalition size. The coalition implements border carbon adjustment to reduce carbon leakage and to … or export subsidy is positive but smaller than the coalition's implicit emission price. With a linear …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012425940
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Self-enforcing international environmental agreements and trade : taxes versus caps
Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger - 2014
This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010404554
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Self-enforcing international environmental agreements and trade : taxes versus caps
Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger - 2014
This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418794
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Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements and Trade : Taxes Versus Caps
Eichner, Thomas - 2014
This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013046588
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Coalitional solution of a game-theoretic emission reduction model
Kozlovskaya, Nadezhda; Petrosjan, Leon A.; Zenkevič, … - In: International game theory review 12 (2010) 3, pp. 275-286
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008907350
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Climate change and game theory
Wood, Peter John - In: Ecological economics reviews, (pp. 153-170). 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009382560
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Self-enforcing international environmental agreements and trade : taxes versus caps
Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger - In: Oxford economic papers 67 (2015) 4, pp. 897-917
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346818
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Environmental coalitions with heterogeneous countries : burden-sharing and carbon leakage
Botteon, Michele; Carraro, Carlo - In: Environmental policy, international agreements, and …, (pp. 38-65). 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001686132
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Environmental coalitions with heterogeneous countries : burden-sharing and carbon leakage
Botteon, Michele; Carraro, Carlo - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000987806
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Overlapping climate clubs : self-enforcing R&D networks to mitigate global warming
Silva, Emilson C. D.; Yamaguchi, Chikara - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-24
Free riding incentives make it difficult to control climate change. To improve the chances of the Paris Agreement's ambitious goal, many nations are forming scientific networks in carbon capture and storage (CCS). These networks take many forms (bilateral, hub-and-spoke, and multilateral)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171806