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Why did shareholder liability disappear? We address this question by looking at its use by British insurance companies …) shareholders saw an opportunity to expunge something they disliked when insurance companies grew in size. Using hand …-collected archival data, our findings suggest investors attached a risk premium to shareholder liability, and it was phased out after a …
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The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand...
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When are shareholders empowered to remove directors from office? This is an important governance issue and is related … to the balance of power between shareholders and directors. In the case of a public company, s 203D(1) of the Australian … Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that shareholders may by ordinary resolution remove a director from office. Section 203D also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012869147
The ideological chasm between environmentalism and a profit driven corporate agenda at times seems insurmountable. Environmental regulation at present is highly reliant upon statutory regulation and governmental intervention whilst corporations law is based to the greatest extent possible on an...
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influence that may come at the detriment of the firm and its shareholders. We confirm that there are marked conflicts of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130042
This article investigates the impact that successful hostile and friendly takeovers have on the rates of top management change for U.K. target firms. The results shows that hostile takeovers are associated with a greater degree of both top executive and top team forced departure rates compared...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013004215
Although both approaches to corporate governance tackle the fundamental principal-agent problem, a basic comparative analysis of the British Codes and the American Sarbanes-Oxley Act reveals a relevant normative asymmetry. While the British regulations have been historically more prescriptive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141442