This chapter describes how liability insurance has contributed to the transparency of the civil justice system. The chapter makes three main points. First, much of what we know about the empirics of the civil justice system comes from access to liability insurance data and personnel. Second, as...

This essay explores how liability insurance mediates the boundary between torts and crime. Liability insurance sometimes separates these two legal fields, for example through the application of standard insurance contract provisions that exclude insurance coverage for some crimes that are also...

We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on the law and economics of liability insurance. The canonical Shavell model predicts that, despite the presence of some ex ante moral hazard (care-reduction by insureds), liability insurance will generally raise welfare because its...

Liability insurers use a variety of tools to address adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance relationships. These tools can act on insureds in a manner that can be understood as regulation. We identify seven categories of such regulatory activities: risk-based pricing, underwriting,...

[A] high degree of scientific and technical uncertainty permeates the insurance industry — the very business that is charged with transforming uncertainty into risk. Scrutiny of how insurers face their own incapacities reveals that theirs is an uncertain business, and that we live not so much...

Using the best publicly available data on lawyers' liability claims and insurance – from the largest insurer of large law firms in the U.S., the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Professional Liability, and a summary of large claims from a leading insurance broker – this...