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Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices

Innes, Robert D. - In: Journal of economic theory 52 (1990) 1, pp. 45-67

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001093344

Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-ante regulation

Innes, Robert D. - In: International review of law and economics 24 (2004) 1, pp. 29-48

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002168370

Optimal liability with stochastic harms, judgement-proof injurers, and asymmetric information

Innes, Robert D. - In: International review of law and economics 19 (1999) 2, pp. 181-203

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001432212

Financial contracting under risk neutrality, limited liability and "ex ante" asymmetric information

Innes, Robert D. - In: Economica 60 (1993) 237, pp. 27-40

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001145237

Fines, Appeals and Liability in Public Enforcement with Stochastic Damage and Asymmetric Information

Innes, Robert - 2004

This paper studies an enforcement game between a regulator and firms that can cause harmful accidents. The distribution of potential accident damage is private information to the firms, and realized damage can be observed only at the cost of going to court. Under conditions described in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070856