The paper proposes a mechanism that may implement first-best effort in simultaneous teams. Within the framework of this mechanism, each team members is obliged to make a fixed, non-contingent payment, and chooses his individual effort. After the output is produced, each team member receives a...

This paper reviews the economic analysis of economic damages, shows the paradoxes of its extension to non-economic damages, and then turns to the three damage measures — value of statistical life (VSL), happiness equivalent, and Hand Rule Damages (HRD)

This Article explores the divergence in law and convergence in economics in dealing with harms and benefits. While tort law usually makes the injurer internalize wrongful harms through damages, restitution law does not enable the benefactor to internalize the benefits she confers on others...

In standard models of contracts, efficient incentives require the promisor to pay damages for non-performance and the promisee to receive no damages. To give efficient incentives to both parties, we propose a novel contract requiring the promisor to pay damages for nonperformance to a third...

Under the usual tort rules, damages for an accident equal the victim's loss (compensation). This paper departs from current law by proposing damages equal to the injurer's gain from untaken precaution divided by the probability of liability (disgorgement damages for accidents, or DDA). DDA is...

According to legal principles, a driver who negligently breaks a pedestrian's leg should pay the same damages as a doctor who negligently breaks a patient's leg. According to economic principles, however, the driver should pay more than the doctor. Non-negligent drivers impose risk on others...