Liability insurers use a variety of tools to address adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance relationships. These tools can act on insureds in a manner that can be understood as regulation. We identify seven categories of such regulatory activities: risk-based pricing, underwriting,...

Using the best publicly available data on lawyers' liability claims and insurance – from the largest insurer of large law firms in the U.S., the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Professional Liability, and a summary of large claims from a leading insurance broker – this...

Victims of intentional torts suffer more than $460 billion of damages each year. Unlike those injured by negligence, however, those injured by intentional acts often have no practical remedy. They cannot recover from judgment proof defendants. And no other part of the compensatory system...

The happiness revolution is coming to legal scholarship. Based on empirical data about the how and why of positive emotions, legal scholars are beginning to suggest reforms to legal institutions. In this article we aim to redirect and slow down this revolution. One of their first targets of...

We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on the law and economics of liability insurance. The canonical Shavell model predicts that, despite the presence of some ex ante moral hazard (care-reduction by insureds), liability insurance will generally raise welfare because its...

Whereas the literature evaluating the effect of tort reforms has focused on reported incurred losses, this paper examines the long run effects using a comprehensive sample by state of individual firms writing medical malpractice insurance from 1984-2003. The long run effects of reforms are...

Whereas the literature evaluating the effect of tort reforms has focused on reported incurred losses, this paper examines the long run effects using a comprehensive sample by state of individual firms writing medical malpractice insurance from 1984-2003. The long run effects of reforms are...