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Health insurance, genetic testing and adverse selection

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Genetic adverse selection : evidence from long-term care insurance and Huntington disease

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Genetic discrimination in health insurance : current legal protections and industry practices

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Genetic testing, income distribution and insurance markets

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Genetic testing when there is a mix of compulsory and voluntary health insurance

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How genetics can inform health economics

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