Mandatory filings for UK hedge funds allow analysis of the effect of managerial employment networks on investment behavior. Employment in the same firm leads to significantly more similar investment behavior in terms of raw returns, abnormal performance (alpha), systematic risk (beta), and...

The behavior of a hedge-fund manager naturally depends on her compensation scheme, her preferences, and constraints on her risk-taking. We propose a numerical method which can be used to analyze the impact of these influences. The model leads to several interesting and novel results concerning...

Numerous hedge funds stop reporting to commercial databases each year. An issue for hedgefund performance estimation is: what delisting return to attribute to such funds? This would be particularly problematic if delisting returns are typically very different from continuing funds' returns. In...

This paper investigates dynamically optimal risk-taking by an expected-utility maximizing manager of a hedge fund. We examine the effects of variations on a compensation structure that includes a percentage management fee, a performance incentive for exceeding a specified highwater mark, and...

When an investor delegates portfolio management to a hedge fund manager, whose risk-taking preference governs? Single-period models with option-like incentives suggest stark variation in risk-taking across fund value and time as fund managers maximize their own well-being. Empirical validation...