Managers of private entrepreneurial firms face obstacles in raising capital both in placing a value on a firm and conveying value to investors. These problems are exacerbated when the firm is small, has limited assets (except for human capital) and has yet to have a lead product. In such cases...

Managers of private entrepreneurial firms face obstacles in raising capital both in placing a value on a firm and conveying value to investors. These problems are exacerbated when the firm is small, has limited assets (except for human capital) and has yet to have a lead product. In such cases...

Managers of private entrepreneurial firms face obstacles in raising capital both in placing a value on a firm and conveying value to investors. These problems are exacerbated when the firm is small, has limited assets (except for human capital) and has yet to have a lead product. In such cases...

We present a theoretical model of startup signaling with multiple signals and potential differences in external investor preferences. For a novel sample of technology incubator startups, we empirically examine the use of patents and founder, friends, and family (FFF) money as such signals,...

"This paper revisits a central issue in entrepreneurial finance, namely the signals technology startups send to external investors to convey information about their quality. We examine the potential for technology startups to use patents and founders, friends and family money (FFF money) as...

We present a theoretical model of startup signaling with multiple signals and potential differences in external investor preferences. For a novel sample of technology incubator startups, we empirically examine the use of patents and founder, friends, and family (FFF) money as such signals,...