The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise … matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized matching market can often outperform a decentralized one. Using a quasi … students to learn about universities and accepting a university that turns out to be inferior causes regret. We discuss and …

The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise … matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized matching market can often outperform a decentralized one. Using a quasi … students to learn about universities and accepting a university that turns out to be inferior causes regret. We discuss and …

. To study centralized college admissions, I advance the theory of stability for many-to-many matching markets with …I propose a centralized clearinghouse for college admissions in which students can signal enthusiasm by commitment, as … in early-decision programs. Furthermore, students can specify financial aid in their preferences and they can be matched …

. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong … incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic consequences for non-strategic students. However, almost none of the new … manipulate. Simultaneously, the admission to each school became strategy-proof to a larger set of students, making the schools …

-qualified students subject to budget and capacity constraints. Student-proposing deferred acceptance is stable and strategy-proof for … students, but the set of stable allocations is large and the scope for manipulation by colleges is substantial, even in large … deferred acceptance, choosing another stable allocation would increase the number of admitted students by at least 3% …

We study many-to-one matching with complementarities. Real life examples include college admissions with two … related to existence of (group) stable matching and existence of strategy-proof and (group) stable mechanism in the presence …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of "centralized college admissions …" (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and "decentralized college admissions" (DCA) where students only apply to one …

In this paper, I investigate matching problems where priorities and preferences are misaligned. In the case of … centralized college admissions, students are matched based on their test scores in standardized tests (priorities), a noisy … realization of their aptitudes (colleges' preferences) due to measurement errors. I show that in this case any matching mechanism …

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin … compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a … the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism …

students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. The main qualitative predictions of the theory are supported by …We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking … students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of …