We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams …. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of “centralized college … admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of "centralized college admissions …" (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and "decentralized college admissions" (DCA) where students only apply to one …

We analyze a college admissions game with asymmetric information between students and colleges. Students' preferences … for colleges depend on the observable quality of the schools. In contrast, colleges' preferences for students depend on … the latter's abilities, which are private information. Students and schools are matched via a decentralized mechanism in …

2013. Costly mistakes have externalities: they transfer tuition waivers from high- to low-socioeconomic status students …, and increase the number of students attending college. To shed light on the mechanisms underlying mistakes, we exploit a …

. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong … incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic consequences for non-strategic students. However, almost none of the new … manipulate. Simultaneously, the admission to each school became strategy-proof to a larger set of students, making the schools …

I propose a centralized clearinghouse for college admissions in which students can signal enthusiasm by commitment, as … in early-decision programs. Furthermore, students can specify financial aid in their preferences and they can be matched …

mechanisms that are more fair by counting: the old mechanism always has at least as many blocking students as the new mechanism …

Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the … performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the … quota for top-grade students before allocating all other seats among remaining applicants. The second is a modified version …

Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the … performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the … quota for top-grade students before allocating all other seats among remaining applicants. The second is a modified version …