Widening access to higher education remains a significant policy challenge. While meeting student intake targets in university admissions is notoriously difficult, additionally pursuing access targets makes universities’ decision problem even more complicated. We introduce a choice procedure,...

In Turkey, as in many other countries, female students perform better in high school and have higher test scores than males. Nevertheless, men still predominate at highly selective programs that lead to high-paying careers. The gender gap at elite schools is particularly puzzling because college...

In a centralized marketplace that was designed to be simple, we identify participants whose choices are dominated. Using administrative data from Hungary, we show that college applicants make obvious mistakes: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver worth thousands of...

We introduce a college admission with tuition transfers problem. In this novel formulation, students' payments are not necessarily equal to their respective tuition fees. However, the total requested tuition fees must be equal to the total payment burden on students. We introduce two mechanism...

We use administrative data from Ireland to study differences in college application behavior between students from disadvantaged versus advantaged high schools. Ireland provides an interesting laboratory for this analysis as applicants provide a preference-ordering of college programs (majors)...

Urban school districts nationwide have increased within-district choice for families. In response, district policymakers are overhauling the systems for applying to and enrolling in schools, with the goal of making it easier and more equitable for students to enroll in schools that are a good...

We use administrative data from Ireland to study differences in college application behavior between students from disadvantaged versus advantaged high schools. Ireland provides an interesting laboratory for this analysis as applicants provide a preference-ordering of college programs (majors)...

The paper analyzes the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets (college admission problems) under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number of participants is large and the length of the preference list is bounded. Under a mild independence assumption on the...

Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the mechanism currently employed by the German central...