This paper considers training, mobility decisions and wages together to test for the specificity of human capital contained in continuing training courses. We empirically analyse the relationship between training, mobility and wages in two ways. First, we examine the correlation between training...

We introduce a dynamic and fully strategic model of wage determination in the presence of firm-specific human capital. In this model, human capital is interpreted as information. We show that equilibrium exists and is efficient and that it gives rise to a unique distribution of the social...

Performance pay in general amounts to only a small fraction of total pay. In this paper, we show that performance pay is nevertheless important for the level and dynamics of wages over the life cycle because of the incentives it indirectly provides for human capital acquisition and because of...

The paper studies human capital accumulation over workers' careers in an on the job search setting with heterogenous firms. In renegotiation proof employment con- tracts, more productive firms provide more training. Both general and specific training induce higher wages within jobs, and with...

The paper studies human capital accumulation over workers' careers in an on the job search setting with heterogenous firms. In renegotiation proof employment con- tracts, more productive firms provide more training. Both general and specific training induce higher wages within jobs, and with...

Dismissal rules, i.e. legally enforced long term contracts, have beem defended against criticism for, among other things, providing efficient incentives to invest in relationship specific skills. However, in many situations efficient investment can also be attained by spot contracts. We...

When labor markets are imperfectly competitive, firms may be willing to finance general training if the wage structure is compressed, that is, if the increase of productivity after training is greater than the increase in pay. We propose a novel way of testing this proposition, which exploits...

According to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, general training is paid by the worker, who reaps all the benefits from the investment. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the greater the training wage premium, the greater the investment in general training. Using data from...

According to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, general training is paid by the worker, who reaps all the benefits from the investment. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the greater the training wage premium, the greater the investment in general training. Using data from...

In this paper it is shown that by explicitly considering the existence of unemployed trained workers, some of the results shown by Acemoglu and Pischke regarding the effect of unemployment on the firms' training decisions become ambiguous. In fact, two contrasting effects have to be considered:...