This study investigates whether mortgage financing regulation unintentionally leads to minorities paying a higher loan contract rate under a risk-based pricing system. We provide evidence that minority borrowers prepay less frequently than comparable non-minority borrowers and thus have lower...

This study investigates whether mortgage financing regulation unintentionally leads to minorities paying a higher loan contract rate under a risk-based pricing system. We provide evidence that minority borrowers prepay less frequently than comparable non-minority borrowers and thus have lower...

This paper attempts to address the issue of borrower heterogeneity when modelling a borrower's mortgage loan termination behaviors (default and prepayment) by applying a nonparametric spatial model to a traditional competing-risks loan hazard model. In this spatial competing-risks hazard model,...

Looking at a sample of conventional fixed-rate mortgages, this paper examines whether lending practices are consistent with the competitive hypothesis that the racial and ethnic composition of the borrower's neighborhood affects the contract rate charged only to the extent that these...

Looking at a sample of conventional fixed-rate mortgages, this paper examines whether lending practices are consistent with the competitive hypothesis that the racial and ethnic composition of the borrower's neighborhood affects the contract rate charged only to the extent that these...