Using panel data for 106 countries in 1971-1997, we estimate generalized least squares regressions to explain IMF lending as well as monetary and fiscal policies in the recipient countries. With respect to moral hazard, we find that a country's rate of monetary expansion and its government...

We develop a public choice model of the International Monetary Fund in which credit and conditionality are simultaneously determined by the demand for, and supply of, IMF credit. A graphical analysis illustrates the comparative statics in response to various shocks. We apply the model to explain...

For a long time, the International Monetary Fund has been criticized for subsidizing its credits. According to Walter Bagehot (1873), a lender of last resort ought to “lend freely but at a penalty.” Otherwise moral hazard results (see Dreher and Vaubel 2004). Bakker and Schrijvers (2000) and...