We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive revelation principle for contracting games in which several principals compete for one privately informed agent. In particular, we show that given any profile of incentive...

In sender-receiver games high-quality types can distinguish themselves from low-quality types by sending a costly signal. Allowing for additional, noisy information on sender types can radically alter sender behavior in such games. We examine equilibria where medium types separate themselves...

In the model a fiscal stabilisation is announced under asymmetry of information between the government and the private investors. The government could be of two types: a dry type and a wet type, according to the amount of spending cuts it decides to make. Private investors may thus lack...

We introduce the framework of noncooperative pregames and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players, there exists approximate (E) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Moreover, an equilibrium can be selected with the property that most players choose the same strategies as all...

This paper studies an otherwise standard principal-agent problem with hidden information, but whether there are positive production externalities between agents: the output of any agent depends positively on the effort expended by the other agents. It is shown that the optimal contract for the...

This paper argues that a mutual relationship exists between the development of institutional investors, and more specifically the development of pension funds, and the development of stock markets. It is shown that the development of pension funds promotes the development of stock markets...

Cet article donne un aperçu general des principales questions couvertes dans la litterature sur la nouvelle economie. On definit celle-ci comme une economie ou l'emergence d'un nouveau secteur de production, celui des Technologies de l'Information et de la Communication (TIC), affecte...