This paper is concerned with the stategic use of a private information on the stock market. A repeated auction model is used to analyze the evolution of the price system on a market with asymmetric information. The model turns out to be a zero-sum repeated game with one-sided information, as...

In an economy with asymmetric information, Rational Expectations Equilibria (REE) need not become asymptotically incentive compatible, even if many independent replicas of the economy are merged together. We identify a sub-class of REE for which this is nevertheless the case. It consists of...

We define a new strategic equilibrium concept -called strong collusion- proof contract -designed to characterize stable communication agreements in games with differential information against non-binding, self enforcing and incentive compatible deviations by coalitions.We then construct a...

based on Chari and Jagannathan (1988), this paper models information-induced and "pure-panic"runs in an environment of risk-aves agents. In this framework, deposits are needed to provide insurance against investors'unexpected demand for liquidity and therefore, a role for financial intermediary...

This paper studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponent's. We characterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an explanation phase is followed by a...

This paper attempts to identify, in a framework deliberately stripped of unnecessary technicalities, some of the basic reasons why adaptative learning may or may not lead to stability and convergence to self-fulfilling expectations in large socioeconomic systems where no agent, or collection of...

The plea bargaining procedure, namely the viability of a stage of bargaining between prosecutor and defendant in criminal suits, is analyzed in the framework of a two-sided incomlete information game.