This paper investigates a simultaneous discrete public good provision game with incomplete information. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider both contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in...

We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive revelation principle for contracting games in which several principals compete for one privately informed agent. In particular, we show that given any profile of incentive...

In traditional theories of regulation, any signal of a firm's activity that is informative will be used for an incentive scheme. This paper develops a simple theory of deregulation in which the manager of a firm is able to distort reports of firm activity, making the degreee of verifiability of...

Suppose, following Kreps & Porteus (1978), that an agent values information not only to make contingent plans but also for itself; that is, intrinsically. What, then, is the relationship between an agent's attitude towards information and her attitude towards risk? If an agent always prefers more...

A major criticism of the information processing hierarchy model of management structure pioneered by Radner and Van Zandt is that it is unrealistic in its description of labor. This paper shows how the existing model can be extende to use labor hours instead of just the number of people...

Covered interest parity seems to hold more strongly for short-term assets than for long-term assets. Credit limits have been suggested as a possible explanation of this phenomenon. This paper contests that hypothesis.

If an agent (wealkly) prefers early resolution of uncertainty then the recursive forms of both the most commonly used non-expected utility models, betweenness and rank dependence, almost reduce to Kreps & Porteus's (1978) recurvise expected utility.

What is the relationship between an agent's attitude towards information, and her attitude towards risk? if an agent always prefers more information does this imply that she obyes the independence axiom? We provide a substitution property on preferences that is equivalent to the agent...

A model of externalities with sequential location choice is developed. The first mover decides on location before it knows the identity of the second mover. Joint location results in a negative externality. The court, having limitd information, allocates property rights over the externality...