We define a new strategic equilibrium concept -called strong collusion- proof contract -designed to characterize stable communication agreements in games with differential information against non-binding, self enforcing and incentive compatible deviations by coalitions.We then construct a...

In this survey article, we report results on the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games with an atomless continuum of players, each with an action set that is not necessarily finite. We also discuss purification and symmetrization of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, and settings in...

In the first place, we present a quasi fixed-point theorem for a correspondence defined on some infinite-dimensional locally convex topological vector space such that some variables have open lower sections and the other ones are upper semicontinuous. In the second place, we propose a direct...

We present the model of games with incomplete information first introduced by Harsanyi and show the link with extensive form games with imperfect information. We provide then a construction of the universal type space of Mertens and Zamir together with some properties.

Symmetry of shocks across countries is often considered as a necessary condition for a monetary union. We show that the measure of shocks symmetry does not reveal a deep parameter, and depends on economic integration. The more integrated economies are, the more aysmmetric are GDPs for a given...

We characterize, for any model of repeated interaction with incomplete information and signals, the information that players can learn through finite procedures robust to unilateral deviations.

This paper shows how to make hold the conjecture stated in Maskin an Tirole about the existence of a close connection between the finite, markovian stationary equilibria of a simple overlapping generations economy and the correlated equilibria of an associated finite exchange economy with...