In this survey we present some of the more significant results in the literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. Sections 1 and 2 introduce the subject and section 3 discusses the monopoly model developed by Stiglitz (1977) for the case of single-period contracts and extended by many...

We discuss how to detect the informational content of household decisions among the explanatory variables of econometric models. Two applications to the choice of automobile insurance contracts and the demand for life insurance are provided. We show that the information provided by additional...

This paper provides bonus-malus systems which rest on different types of claims. Consistent estimators are given for some moments of themixing distribution of a multi equation Poisson model with random effects. Bonus-malus coefficients are then obtained with the expected value principle, and...

This paper characterizes optimal insurance policies under deterministic auditing, in a situation where the policyholders can misrepresent their losses.

This paper aims at providing linear credibility predictors for the pure premium of insurance contracts, from a rating structure based on their individual characteristics. A two equation model with random effects and regression components is consistently estimated, jointly with the computation of...

We provide a characterization of an optimal insurance contract (coverage schedule and audit policy) when the monitoring procedure is random. When the policyholder exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, the optimal contract involves a positive indemnity payment with a deductible when the...

The purpose of this paper is to study the prevention impact upon the economic dynamics. We use an overlapping-generations model with production in which we have introduced a financial loss for households. This risk is endogenous and depends on the individual prevention levels. The dynamic paths...

The goal of this study is to develop a tool to aid insurance company adjusters in their decision making and to ensure that they are better equipped to fight fraud.

Information problems have a large role to play in insurance markets and the regulations governing these markets were in part designed to take such problems into account. Classification variables are usually the tools used to reduce adverse selection, whereas bonus-malus (or merit-rating) schemes...