We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information when the market value of deposit insurance can be determined using Merton's (1977, 3-11) formula.

This paper provides a survey on optimal insurance when insurers and policy holdes have symmetric information about the distribution of potential damages. When transaction costs are proportional to transfers, we show that 1)there is at least one state of the world where no indemnity is paid, 2)...

We consider a model in which the agent faces two independant risks of losswith different probabilities of occurence and (possibly) different levels of potential loss. We show that it is optimal to select a deductable for the low probability event that is not larger than the optimal deductable...

The shares of the public sector in health insurance provision varies enormously from country to country. It is larger in more redistributive countries. We provide a possible theoretical explanation for these facts: a public health insurance system, financed by taxes, can be an efficient means of...