We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information when the market value of deposit insurance can be determined using Merton's (1977, 3-11) formula.

This paper provides a survey on optimal insurance when insurers and policy holdes have symmetric information about the distribution of potential damages. When transaction costs are proportional to transfers, we show that 1)there is at least one state of the world where no indemnity is paid, 2)...

We consider a model in which the agent faces two independant risks of losswith different probabilities of occurence and (possibly) different levels of potential loss. We show that it is optimal to select a deductable for the low probability event that is not larger than the optimal deductable...

The shares of the public sector in health insurance provision varies enormously from country to country. It is larger in more redistributive countries. We provide a possible theoretical explanation for these facts: a public health insurance system, financed by taxes, can be an efficient means of...

In this paper, we propose an empirical analysis of the presence of adverse selection in an insurance market. We first present a theroetical model of a market with adverse selection and we introduce different issues related to transaction costs, accident costs, risk aversion and moral hazard. We...

We introduce nonlinear panel data models for individual risl management and control. Our approach extends traditional models by allowing for nonlinearities in input variables and unobserved individual heterogeneity with possible temporal dependence. This permits us to develop nonlineat models...

We discuss how to detect the informational content of household decisions among the explanatory variables of econometric models. Some applications to the choice of automobile insurance contracts and to the demand for life insurance are provided. We show that the information provided by...

In this paper, we propose an empirical analysis of the presence of adverse selection in an insurance market. We first present a theoretical model of a market with adverse selection and we introduce different issues related to transaction costs, accident costs, risk aversion and moral hazard. We...

We discuss how to detect the informational content of household decisions among the explanatory variables of econometric models. Two applications to the choice of automobile insurance contracts and the demand for life insurance are provided. We show that the information provided by additional...