This paper presents a model of legal migration from one source country to two host countries, both of which can control their levels of immigration. Because of complementarities between capital and labor, the return on capital is positively related to the level of immigration. Consequently, when...

This paper analyzes the issues of immigration and outsourcing in a general-equilibrium model of international factor mobility. In our model, legal immigration is controlled through a quota, while outsourcing is determined both by the firms (in response to market conditions) and through...

This paper presents a model of legal migration of temporary skilled workers from one source country to two host countries, both of which can control their levels of such immigration. Because of complementarities between capital and labor, the return on capital is positively related to the level...

This paper analyzes immigration and outsourcing in a general-equilibrium model of international factor mobility. In our model, legal immigration of skilled labor is controlled through a quota, while outsourcing is determined both by the firms in response to market conditions and through...

This paper presents a model of legal migration from one source country to two host countries, both of which can control their levels of immigration. Because of complementarities between capital and labor, the return on capital is positively related to the level of immigration. Consequently, when...