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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011979745
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538932
This paper proposes a test for the existence and degree of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. First, we theoretically decompose moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior and derive testable conditions. Then, we implement the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011386819
This paper proposes a test for the existence and degree of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. First, we theoretically decompose moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior and derive testable conditions. Then, we implement the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011339778
This paper proposes a test for the existence and degree of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. First, we theoretically decompose moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior and derive testable conditions. Then, we implement the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011340177
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012160424
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011824087
In this paper, we analyze technology transfers (TT) and tradable emission rights, which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations. Subsidizing TT leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in developing countries, thereby reducing the international permit price. This is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009411362
This paper proposes a test for the existence and degree of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. First, we theoretically decompose moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior and derive testable conditions. Then, we implement the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970324
This paper proposes a test for the existence and degree of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. First, we theoretically decompose moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior and derive testable conditions. Then, we implement the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013012140