In this paper, a model of an ecosystem influenced by a large human population is presented. It is modelled by a discrete time dynamic game with many players and a simple dynamics. The paper proposes a new way to look at the problems of exploitation of ecosystems by many users — using the...

We show that in multi-sender communication games where senders imperfectly observe the state, if the state space is large enough, then there can exist equilibria arbitrarily close to full revelation of the state as the noise in the senders' observations gets small. In the case of replacement...

Since its early days, the Internet has been used by the music industry as a powerful marketing tool to promote artists and their products. Nevertheless, technology developments of the past ten years, and especially the ever-growing phenomenon of file sharing, have created the general impression...

We consider an extensive form game to analyze the interdependence between environmental protection of resources, the activities related with the tourism and the behavior of a local population. We answer two questions: 1) Suppose that the central planner invest in tourist activities, has he...

Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes...

Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes...

We use a two-person linear voluntary contribution mechanism with stochastic marginal benefits from the public good to examine the effect of imperfect information on contributions levels. To assess prior risk attitudes, individual valuations of several risky prospects are elicited via a...

A novel two-person "charity game" is used to experimentally investigate whether anticipation of help crowds out incentives to work, and therefore impulses to help. We distinguish two treatments differing in whether the causes of neediness are verifiable or not. Helping behavior does not vary...

Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as <i>passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs</i> rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes...

We study the Diamond–Dybvig model of financial intermediation (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) under the assumption that depositors have information about previous decisions. Depositors decide sequentially whether to withdraw their funds or continue holding them in the bank. If depositors observe...