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Mechanisms for efficient voting with private information about preferences
Engelmann, Dirk; Grimm, Veronika - 2008
We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010299751
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Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values
van den Brink, René; Funaki, Yukihiko; Ju, Yuan - 2007
of solutions using monotonicity properties. Finally, we provide a non-cooperative implementation for these solutions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325573
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Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values
van den Brink, Rene; Funaki, Yukihiko - 2010
characterizes the corresponding delta-discounted Shapley value. Moreover, we provide a strategic implementation of these solutions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326064
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Learning and Implementation on the Internet
Friedman, Eric; Shenker, Scott - 1998
We address the problem of learning and implementation on the Internet. When agents play repeated games in distributed … context. Finally, we discuss implementation of social choice functions with these solution concepts. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334355
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Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games
Milchtaich, Igal - 2009
In a correlated equilibrium, the players' choice of actions is affected by random, correlated messages that they receive from an outside source, or mechanism. This allows for more equilibrium outcomes than without such messages (pure-strategy equilibrium) or with statistically independent ones...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336013
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On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game
Duman, Papatya; Trockel, Walter - 2016
interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582516
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Supermodular mechanism design
Mathevet, Laurent A. - In: Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) 3, pp. 403-443
equilibrium. Finally, I provide a revelation principle for supermodular implementation in environments with general preferences. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599433
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An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution
Trockel, Walter - 2009
is provided for subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, it is indicated how these results can be extended to implementation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272572
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Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core
Kóczy, László Á. - 2009
We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279466
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Decentralized Task Coordination
Gudmundsson, Jens; Hougaard, Jens Leth; Platz, Trine Tornøe - 2020
We study decentralized task coordination. Tasks are of varying complexity and agents asymmetric: agents capable of completing high-level tasks may also take on tasks originally contracted by lower-level agents, facilitating system-wide cost reductions. We suggest a family of decentralized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012304467