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The implementation duality
Nöldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - 2015
underlying implementation duality. We show how this duality can be used to obtain a sharpening of the taxation principle, to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010499578
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The Implementation Duality
Noldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015
underlying implementation duality. We show how this duality can be used to obtain a sharpening of the taxation principle, to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011201348
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The Implementation Duality
Nöldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum, Universität Basel - 2015
underlying implementation duality. We show how this duality can be used to obtain a sharpening of the taxation principle, to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011204529
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The implementation duality
Nöldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503462
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Hidden action, identification, and organization design
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2010
-tasking problem. -- moral hazard ; hidden action ; implementation ; multi-tasking ; identification by organization design …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009303451
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Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
Mishra, Debasis; Pramanik, Anup; Roy, Souvik - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 103-116
We consider implementation of a deterministic allocation rule using transfers in quasi-linear private values …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930783
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Renegotiation-proof Mechanism Design
Neeman, Zvika; Pavlov, Gregory - University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics - 2010
We study a mechanism design problem under the assumption that renegotiation cannot be prevented. We investigate what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are renegotiation-proof under a variety of renegotiation procedures, and which social choice functions can be implemented in a way that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583353
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Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design
Neeman, Zvika; Pavlov, Gregory - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 2, pp. 473-501
We study what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are ex post renegotiation-proof (EPRP), i.e., robust against the possibility of ex post renegotiation under a variety of renegotiation procedures, and which social choice functions are EPRP implementable. In complete information environments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042983
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The Principal-Agent Matching Market
Dam, Kaniska; Pérez-Castrillo, David - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2001
We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572268
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Decision Initiation, Decision Implementation, and the Allocation of Decision Rights
Sloof, Randolph; von Siemens, Ferdinand A. - 2015
initiation and implementation. If these have social preferences, they might thus sabotage both project choices and implementation … to express their discontent with the allocation of decision rights. How decisions come about also affects implementation … implementation leads to more delegation, but only if workers have high costs of obstructing informed decisions. We further find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011403558