Similar Search Results

A simple mechanism for the roommate problem

Evci, Bora - 2014

Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the roommate problem …". And, they showed that unlike the marriage problem, the roommate problem may have unstable solutions. In other words, the … implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal matching in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011716017

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

Azacis, Helmuts - 2005

I consider the problem of assigning agents to indivisible objects, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011517013

Decentralized task coordination

Gudmundsson, Jens; Hougaard, Jens Leth; Platz, Trine Tornøe - 2020

We study decentralized task coordination. Tasks are of varying complexity and agents asymmetric: agents capable of completing high-level tasks may also take on tasks originally contracted by lower-level agents, facilitating system-wide cost reductions. We suggest a family of decentralized...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012299210

The Principal-Agent Matching Market

Dam, Kaniska; Pérez-Castrillo, David - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2001

model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal …-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572268

Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint

Azacis, Helmuts - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010322828

Decentralized Task Coordination

Gudmundsson, Jens; Hougaard, Jens Leth; Platz, Trine Tornøe - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012304467

Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy

Triossi, Matteo; Romero-Medina, Antonio - Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino - 2006

centralized mechanism associated to the Program is analyzed. The paper models it as a two-sided matching market and studies if it …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765471

Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint

Azacis, Helmuts - Economics Section, Cardiff Business School - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980213

Application Costs in Sequential Admission Mechanisms

Triossi, Matteo - Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino - 2006

This paper considers a realistic family of admission mechanisms, with multiple applications and application costs. Multiple applications impose serious coordination problems to colleges, but application costs restore stability. Without application costs and under incomplete information unstable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094082

Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint

Azacis, Helmuts - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582632

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