This paper investigates whether monitoring by bank lenders affects CEO incentives of borrowing firms. We find that an … increase in bank monitoring incentives significantly reduce the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (Vega … CEO incentives to mitigate the risk-shifting incentives of firm managers …

This paper studies the effect of monetary incentives on mortgage renegotiation. Lenders are sometimes willing to … not to modify the terms of the mortgage. The model is used to examine outcomes in the presence of monetary incentives … renegotiate mortgage contracts with homeowners who are at risk of foreclosure. This paper models the renegotiation process as a …

This research explores effective (economic) property rights granted to contractual parties when a home mortgage is in … default. We build upon an existing literature that describes incentives to lenders and borrowers to pursue or prevent … increase the incentives of lenders to avoid foreclosure but not enough to offset the financial incentives provided to home …