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Carrot and stick : how reemployment bonuses and benefit sanctions affect job finding rates
Klaauw, Bas van der; Ours, Jan C. van - 2010
various financial incentives, including both carrots to sticks. Once their benefit spell exceeded one year, welfare recipients … bonuses were not. -- welfare to work ; financial incentives ; timing-of-events ; dynamic selection …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008689033
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Carrot and stick : how reemployment bonuses and benefit sanctions affect job finding rates
Klaauw, Bas van der; Ours, Jan C. van - 2010
various financial incentives, including both carrots to sticks. Once their benefit spell exceeded one year, welfare recipients …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380926
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Carrot and Stick : How Reemployment Bonuses and Benefit Sanctions Affect Job Finding Rates
van der Klaauw, Bas - 2010
various financial incentives, including both carrots to sticks. Once their benefit spell exceeded one year, welfare recipients …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141214
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Carrot and stick : how reemployment bonuses and benefit sanctions affect job finding rates
Klaauw, Bas van der; Ours, Jan C. van - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003994474
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The Role of Sickness in the Evaluation of Job Search Assistance and Sanctions
van den Berg, Gerard J. - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000204
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The Role of Sickness in the Evaluation of Job Search Assistance and Sanctions
van den Berg, Gerard J. - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001341
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Carrot and Stick: How Reemployment Bonuses and Benefit Sanctions Affect Job Finding Rates
Klaauw, Bas van der; Ours, Jan C. van - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003992632
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Carrot and stick : how reemployment bonuses and benefit sanctions affect job finding rates
Klaauw, Bas van der; Ours, Jan C. van - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003985286
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Carrot and stick : how re-employment bonuses and benefit sanctions affect exit rates from welfare
Klaauw, Bas van der; Ours, Jan C. van - In: Journal of applied econometrics 28 (2013) 2, pp. 275-296
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009733329
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Optimal unemployment insurance design : time limits, monitoring, or workfare?
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003
workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity … monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so … monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509411