We study the effect of power sharing over income redistribution among different socio-economic groups in a model of redistributive politics with fairness concern. We prove that a unique pure-strategy equilibrium exists under fairly general conditions; and we show that equilibrium transfers...

Ideally, a representative democracy awards a genuine vote to each adult. We study whether this applies in competitive democracies with an election model combining district appor- tionment and proportional representation (PR). Four classic seat allocation rules, including d'Hondt (1882), are...

This paper examines the effect of immigration on the level of income redistribution via majority voting on the income tax. As a main result, we derive multiple tax equilibria if immigrants are allowed to vote and the skill composition of natives is not too homogeneous. In this case, the outcome...

We investigate the geographical concentration of representatives and the distribution of fiscal transfers both theoretically and empirically. We develop a model which predicts that funds to an area are positively correlated with the number of representatives residing in that area. Our empirical...

This paper discusses the fundamental determinants of inequality. These are identified as world or market forces, social norms, ownership of real and human capital, and the role of government. The change in the relative role of these factors in determining inequality during economic development...

Performing a panel data analysis for OECD countries, during the period between 1990 and 2019, this article investigates the relationship between economic growth and income inequalities. The main objective is to understand how the GDP and GNI per capita affect income inequality and how they...