We analyze a coordination game characterised by varying degrees of conflict of interest, incentive to coordinate and information asymmetry. The primary objective is to question whether endogenous leadership better enables coordination. A secondary objective is to question whether preference and...

We examine the problem of an investor who trades in a market with unobservable regime shifts. The investor learns from past prices and is subject to transaction costs. Our model generates significantly larger liquidity premia compared to a benchmark model with observable market shifts. The...

I propose an intertemporal precautionary saving model in which the agent's labor income is subject to (possibly correlated) shocks with different degrees of persistence and volatility. However, he only observes his total income, not individual components. I show that partial observability of...

This paper analyzes consumers' privacy choice concerning their private data and firms' ensuing pricing strategy. The General Data Protection Regulation passed by the European Union in May 2018 allows consumers to decide whether to reveal private information in the form of cookies to an online...

Duty-orientation implies a warm glow of giving as well as a cold shiver of not giving enough. If duty-oriented consumers learn their moral responsibility by observing others' behavior, social interaction in contribution behavior arises. However, since moral responsibility is a burden,...

We investigate how an informed designer maximizes her objective when facinga player whose payoff depends on both the designer's private information andon an unknown state within the classical quasilinear environment. Thedesigner can disclose arbitrary information about the state via...

This paper introduces a theory of market incompleteness based on the information transmission role of prices and its adverse impact on the provision of insurance in financial markets. We analyse a simple security design model in which the number and payoff of securities are endogenous. Agents...

In a correlated equilibrium, the players' choice of actions is affected by random, correlated messages that they receive from an outside source, or mechanism. This allows for more equilibrium outcomes than without such messages (pure-strategy equilibrium) or with statistically independent ones...

We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert...

We analyze a cheap-talk model in which an informed sender and an uninformed receiver engage in a finite-period communication before the receiver chooses a project. During the communication phase, the sender sends a message in each period, and the receiver then voluntarily pays money for the...