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Organizations with incomplete information : essays in economic analysis; a tribute to Roy Radner

Majumdar, Mukul (ed.); Radner, Roy (honouree) - 1998 - 1. publ.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013493910

Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information

Myerson, Roger B. - In: Journal of economic theory 136 (2007) 1, pp. 260-285

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003552134

Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information

Myerson, Roger B. - In: Game-theoretic models of bargaining, (pp. 115-147). 1985

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001260236

The sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information

Leininger, Wolfgang; Linhart, Peter B.; Radner, Roy - 1987

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000730695

A profit-center game with incomplete information

Ichiishi, Tatsuro; Radner, Roy - In: Review of economic design : RED 4 (1999) 4, pp. 307-343

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001465375

Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information

Leininger, Wolfgang

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001272221

A Profit-Center Game with Incomplete Information

lchiishi, Tatsuro - 2008

Profit centers in a firm in multidivisional form agree in the ex antestage upon a plan about their joint production and profit imputation. The plan isexecuted in the subsequent two periods of the interim stage. In the first interimperiod, each center has its private information, but a part of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012769629

Bargaining with incomplete information

Linhart, Peter B. (ed.); Radner, Roy (contributor); … - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013474711

The sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information

Leininger, Wolfgang; Linhart, Peter; Radner, Roy - University of Bonn, Germany - 1987

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001453

A profit-center game with incomplete information

Radner, Roy; Ichiishi, Tatsuro - In: Review of Economic Design 4 (1999) 4, pp. 307-343

Profit centers in a firm in multidivisional form agree in the ex ante stage upon a plan about their joint production and profit imputation. The plan is executed in the subsequent two periods of the interim stage: the setup period and the manufacturing period. In the setup period, each center has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596558