A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the … matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically … assumes that the agents have complete information, and examines core outcomes. We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in …

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …

A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the … matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically … assumes that the agents have complete information, and examines core outcomes. We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in …

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …

The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a … incentive compatible core can be empty, even if utility functions are quasi-linear. If, in addition to quasi-linearity, further … assumptions are made (like independent private values), the non-emptiness of the core follows nevertheless from d'Aspremont and …

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …

A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the … matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically … assumes that the agents have complete information, and examines core outcomes. We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in …