We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of "centralized college admissions …" (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and "decentralized college admissions" (DCA) where students only apply to one …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams …. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of “centralized college … admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to …

We analyze a college admissions game with asymmetric information between students and colleges. Students' preferences … for colleges depend on the observable quality of the schools. In contrast, colleges' preferences for students depend on … the latter's abilities, which are private information. Students and schools are matched via a decentralized mechanism in …

We conduct a field experiment with 302 workers of the microcredit company in Russia to study the effects of the … four prizes of different size and compare it to "parallel" contests with the same prizes, but where participants have to … same prize. Despite the theoretical predictions, the parallel contests lead to higher efforts for all players, but mainly …

paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … them. Through a pre-registered and theory-guided laboratory experiment, we provide evidence that such reciprocal … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

I study a two-period matching model where one side of the market (e.g. workers) have an option to invest and delay … matching in the first period. Investment increases each agent's matching surplus in the second period, by a magnitude of the …-transferable utility. My analysis suggests that efficient investment is a robust prediction in sequential matching markets …

Two notions of stability, ex ante stability and Bayesian stability, are investigated in a matching model with non …-transferrable utility, interdependent preferences, and one-sided incomplete information. Ex ante stable matching-outcomes are unblocked for … every belief on the blocking partner's type while Bayesian stable matching-outcomes are unblocked with respect to prior …