paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

Two notions of stability, ex ante stability and Bayesian stability, are investigated in a matching model with non …-transferrable utility, interdependent preferences, and one-sided incomplete information. Ex ante stable matching-outcomes are unblocked for … every belief on the blocking partner's type while Bayesian stable matching-outcomes are unblocked with respect to prior …

We study a one-to-one two-sided matching market in which each man has a common value for all women and a private value … which a woman proposes to a random man in each step. We prove that envy in a matching market is bounded by envy in this … of the square root of the number of men in each type. Therefore, in large matching markets, envy becomes zero; on top of …

I study a two-period matching model where one side of the market (e.g. workers) have an option to invest and delay … matching in the first period. Investment increases each agent's matching surplus in the second period, by a magnitude of the …-transferable utility. My analysis suggests that efficient investment is a robust prediction in sequential matching markets …

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …

We provide a framework for studying two-sided matching markets with incomplete information. The framework accommodates …

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …

This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the …