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Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games
Vohra, Rajiv; Serrano, Roberto - 2009
in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete … among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra (2003) and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064860
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Alternative approaches to analyze the role of beliefs in strategic interaction
Sander, Philipp; Hauenschild, Nils; Ziems, Danny - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003635731
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Information transmission in coalitional voting games
Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - In: Journal of economic theory 134 (2007) 1, pp. 117-137
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003480181
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Information transmission in coalitional voting games
Serrano, Roberto (contributor); Vohra, Rajiv (contributor) - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003423306
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Cooperative games with incomplete information : some open problems
Forges, Françoise; Serrano, Roberto - In: International game theory review 15 (2013) 2, pp. 1-17
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010126760
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Information transmission in coalitional voting games
Serrano, Roberto (contributor); Vohra, Rajiv (contributor) - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002646412
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Legislative Coalitions with Incomplete Information
Dragu, Tiberiu - 2017
In most parliamentary democracies, proportional representation electoral rules mean that no single party controls a majority of seats in the legislature. This in turn means that the formation of majority legislative coalitions in such settings is of critical political importance. Conventional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012954606
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Collaborative profit allocation schemes for logistics enterprise coalitions with incomplete information
Liu, Jia-Cai; Sheu, Jiuh Biing; Li, Deng-Feng; Dai, Yong-Wu - In: Omega : the international journal of management science 101 (2021), pp. 1-13
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012494660
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Hanging together or hanged separately : the strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information
Konrad, Kai A.; Cusack, Thomas R. - 2014
members of the coalition group for equilibrium payoffs and welfare effects. In this analysis, we also distinguish between … coalition groups with and without side payments. Overall, coalition groups tend to perform well for the members of the coalition … group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012053740
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Taking a shower in youth hostels : risks and delights of heterogeneity
Matzke, Christina (contributor); Challet, Damien (contributor) - 2008
Tuning one's shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect information. The temperature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions, identical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003612880