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The sealed-bid k-double auction mechanism for two-person bargaining under incomplete information can be extended by providing a bonus for both traders if, and only if, an agreement is reached. Brams and Kilgour (1996) proved that there is a unique level of bonus, namely, half the difference...
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This chapter focuses on a series of experiments investigating decision behavior in single-stage, two-person bargaining over the exchange of a single commodity, where neither trader knows with precision the reservation value that the other places on the good or service being bought or sold....
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