social interaction effects. Testing for such effects raises severe identification problems. We conduct an experiment that …

interaction effects. We conduct a laboratory experiment that avoids the identification problem present in the field and allows us …

interaction effects. We conduct an experiment that avoids the identification problem present in the field. Our novel design …

This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide … punished. As a consequence, the existence of an opportunity for costly punishment causes a large increase in cooperation levels … because potential free riders face a credible threat. We show, in particular, that in the presence of a costly punishment …

the use of loaded language significantly reduces the incidence of bribery and increases the level of punishment …. Punishment of bribery leads to reduced bribery in future. The evidence suggests that this game captures essential features of a …

We provide a direct test of the role of social preferences in voluntary cooperation. We elicit individuals' cooperation … preference in one experiment and make a point prediction about the contribution to a repeated public good. This allows for a … novel test as to whether there are types of players who behave consistently with their elicited preferences. We find clear …

We provide a direct test of the role of social preferences in voluntary cooperation. We elicit individuals' cooperation … preference in one experiment and make a point prediction about the contribution to a repeated public good. This allows for a … novel test as to whether there are types of players who behave consistently with their elicited preferences. We find clear …