In developing countries where elections are costly and accountability mechanisms weak, politicians often turn to illicit means of financing campaigns. This paper examines one such channel of illicit campaign finance: India’s real estate sector. Politicians and builders allegedly engage in a...

Using rainfall, public relief, and election data from India, we examine how governments respond to adverse shocks and how voters react to these responses. The data show that voters punish the incumbent party for weather events beyond its control. However, fewer voters punish the ruling party...

Almost none of the 300 Indian reservations located in the lower forty-eight states possess functioning economies in which reservation residents and visitors can purchase the goods and services commonly available in the U.S. economy. A private, free market economy obviously requires private...

We examine how political participation and political competition are shaped by two class-based extensions of the franchise in 20th-century India. Creating a new dataset of district level political outcomes between 1921 and 1957, we find that the partial franchise extension of 1935 resulted in...

This paper analyzes the effect of a redrawing of political boundaries on voting patterns and investigates whether it leads to closer conformity of an electorate's voting patterns with its political preferences. We study these issues in the context of a reorganization of states in India. In 2000,...

Indian country in the United States is incredibly poor. Indian nations desperately need to develop reservation economic activities. Most tribal governments, however, are primarily focused on developing tribally owned businesses. This article argues for Indian peoples and governments to revive...

Are elected politicians treated more leniently when facing criminal charges? I present evidence of judicial discretion for the largest democracy in the world, India. Using a regression discontinuity design, I compare the probability of a pending criminal case being closed without conviction at...

Where elections are costly but accountability mechanisms are weak, politicians often turn to private firms for illicit election finance. Where firms are highly regulated, politicians can exchange policy discretion or regulatory forbearance for bribes and monetary transfers from firms. Due to its...

We examine how political participation and political competition are shaped by two class-based extensions of the franchise in 20th-century India. Creating a new dataset of district level political outcomes between 1921 and 1957, we find that the partial franchise extension of 1935 resulted in...

Firms establish political connections when they either donate money to the political parties or appoint politicians on the board of directors of the company. These political connections are found to facilitate access to credit, among various other things. Creating a new and unique dataset of...