We construct an asymmetri c duopolistic R&D and production behavior model subject to knowledge spillovers. This model is an extension to the symmetric model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (A&J (1988)) and aims to determine the cooperative and non-cooperative R&D strategies for two agents of...

This paper conducts a comprehensive study of patent citations in patents granted to Belgian corporate applicants by the United States and the European Patent Offices using qualitative response variable analysis. The analysis uncovered different patterns of citations in patents, which belong to...

This paper investigates two major issues of the patenting behavior of Belgian firms. Firstly, it studies the probabilistic distribution of the patent citations among several major sectors. Secondly, the firm-oriented data is studied to investigate the relationships between the Belgian firms size...

This paper conducts a comprehensive study of patent citations in patents granted to Belgian corporate applicants by the United States and the European Patent Offices using qualitative response variable analysis. The analysis uncovered different patterns of citations in patents, which belong to...

The authors construct an asymmetric duopolistic R&D and production behavior model subject to knowledge spillovers. This model is an extension to the symmetric model of d'Aspremont and Jaquemin (A&J (1988)) and aims to determine the cooperative and non-cooperative R&D strategiesfor two agents of...

This paper investigates two major issues of the patenting behavior of Belgian firms. Firstly, it studies the probabilistic distribution of the patent citations among several major sectors. Secondly, the firm-oriented data is studied to investigate the relationship between the Belgian firms' size...

This paper studies R&D investment decisions of a firm facing the threat of new technology entry and subject to technical uncertainty. We distinguish four scenarios: inevitable entry, entry deterrence, entry blockade, and non-credible entry threat. The entry threat stimulates the incumbent to...

This paper presents a dynamic model of a competitive R&D and production duopoly subject to knowledge spillovers. Two asymmetric firms operate for a limited period of time and dispose their knowledge capital in the end. Both firms and the social planner prefer the R&D-cooperative strategy over...