This paper offers a general equilibrium model to analyze the problem of investment in Ramp;D of firms that also face the decision between outsourcing and quot;in-housequot; production in the presence of Ramp;D information leakage. A contractor hired by a firm learns the firmacirc;not;quot;s...

This paper offers a general equilibrium model to analyze the problem of Ramp;D investment of firms that also face the decision between outsourcing and in-house production in the presence of Ramp;D information leakage. A contractor hired by a firm learns the firmacirc;not;quot;s technology and can...

This paper offers a general equilibrium model to analyze the problem of Ramp;D investment of firms that also face the decision between outsourcing and in-house production in the presence of Ramp;D information leakage. A contractor hired by a firm learns the firm's technology and can diffuse the...