This article reviews the impact of intellectual property (IP) protection on foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises (MNEs) in developing countries. Applying different panel data techniques to a newly-created comprehensive FDI/IP dataset of 31 Swiss MNEs investing into 53...

This paper investigates the R&D allocation and output decisions of a profit-maximising monopolist developing a science-based family of products or processes. A comparison of the numerical solution for a model with incremental product innovation, and that with incremental process innovation,...

In this paper I construct a dynamic oligopolistic model of research joint ventures (RJVs). In my model, when firms form an RJV, they invest to improve product quality, and fully share the rewards of research success. RJVs benefit firms by eliminating duplicative research efforts, but firms also...

We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (American Economic Review, 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We...

We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (The American Economic Review 78(5): 1133-1137, 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market...

This paper studies the asset pricing implications of technology spillover, an important externality in innovation. While technology spillover enables firms to produce a variety of products that better satisfy their customers' love for variety, such benefits are procyclical, and investors...

The imperfect appropriability of revenues from innovation affects the incentives of firms to invest, and to disclose information about their innovative productivity. It creates a free-rider effect in the competition for the innovation that countervails the familiar business-stealing effect....

We study a model of dynamic two-stage R&D competition where the competing firms are uncertain about the difficulty of the first stage. Staying in the competition is costly and a firm can also choose whether and when to quit. When a firm solves the first stage, it can choose whether and when to...

To determine patentability, inventions are evaluated in light of existing prior art. Innovators have a duty to disclose any prior art that they are aware of, but have no obligation to search. We study innovators' incentives to search for prior art, their search intensities and the timing. We...