This paper develops an overlapping-generations model including wage inequality within a generation and intra- and intergenerational resource reallocation via social security. Based on the concept of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium, the paper focuses on the feedback mechanism between...

This paper characterizes a stationary Markov perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts their educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following...

This paper characterizes a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following...

This paper develops a model where income inequality and intergenerational mo- bility are jointly determined via redistributive politics. The model includes two key factors: accessibility of tertiary education for poor-born agents and multiple self- ful?lling expectations of agents. Given these...

This paper develops a model where income inequality and intergenerational mobility are jointly determined via redistributive politics. The model includes two key factors: accessibility of tertiary education for poor-born agents and multiple, selffulfilling expectations of agents. Given these...