Conventional wisdom says that commitment eliminates the inflationary bias of monetary policy. However, this paper shows that the inflation bias can persist even when the central bank commits. A simple model is presented in which the central bank precommits by setting the policy instrument, and...

Conventional wisdom says that commitment eliminates the inflationary bias of monetary policy. However, this paper shows that the inflation bias can persist even when the central bank commits. A simple model is presented in which the central bank precommits by setting the policy instrument, and...

We analyze determinacy and stability under learning (E-stability) of rational expectations equilibria in the Blanchard and Galí (2006, 2008) New-Keynesian model of inflation and unemployment, where labor market frictions due to costs of hiring workers play an important role. We derive results...

This paper investigates the implications of monetary policy rules during the surge and subsequent decline of inflation in the euro area and compares them to the interest rate decisions of the European Central Bank (ECB). It focuses on versions of the Taylor (1993) and Orphanides and Wieland (OW)...

We study the properties of the optimal nominal interest rate policy under different levels of price indexation. In our model indexation regulates the sources of inflation persistence. When indexation is zero, the inflation gap is purely forward- looking and inflation persistence depends only on...

Inflation in advanced economies is low by historical standards but there is no threat of deflation. Slower economic growth is caused by supply-side constraints rather than low inflation. Below-the-target inflation does not damage the reputation of central banks. Thus, central banks should not...

We examine the use of central bank capital as an unconventional monetary policy tool. In this setting, a central bank employs digital currency to transfer digital cash to each household, thus supporting consumption directly when needed. The asset side of the central bank's balance sheet remains...

In 1994 the Federal Reserve System moved to a more transparent reporting of monetary policy. In this paper we first discuss the evolution of Federal Reserve transparency in U.S. and second we test its effectiveness. We assess the empirical impact of monetary policy transparency on the...

Should central banks increase their degree of transparency any further? We show that there is likely to be an optimal intermediate degree of central bank transparency. Up to this optimum more transparency is desirable: it improves the quality of private sector inflation forecasts. But beyond the...

It has been argued that economies with more independent central banks experience lower inflation over time. In this paper we show that this relationship is sensitive to the methodology through which central bank independence indices are constructed. We stress the importance of employing dynamic...