Excessive inflation is usually attributed to the lack of central bank’s credibility. In this context, most of the literature considers transparency a means to establish central bank’s credibility. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it shows that, even in the absence of...

Excessive inflation is usually attributed to the lack of central bank's credibility. In this context, most of the literature considers transparency a means to establish central bank's credibility. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it shows that, even in the absence of...

This paper studies monetary policy committee transparency (MPCT) based on a new index that measures central bankers' educational and professional backgrounds as disclosed through central bank websites. Based on a novel cross-sectional data set covering 75 central banks, we investigate the...

In 1994 the Federal Reserve System moved to a more transparent reporting of monetary policy. In this paper we first discuss the evolution of Federal Reserve transparency in U.S. and second we test its effectiveness. We assess the empirical impact of monetary policy transparency on the...

Should central banks increase their degree of transparency any further? We show that there is likely to be an optimal intermediate degree of central bank transparency. Up to this optimum more transparency is desirable: it improves the quality of private sector inflation forecasts. But beyond the...

It has been argued that economies with more independent central banks experience lower inflation over time. In this paper we show that this relationship is sensitive to the methodology through which central bank independence indices are constructed. We stress the importance of employing dynamic...

This paper analyzes the pillar of modern central bank governance, i.e. central bank independence, highlighting three contributions. First, we provide a systematic review of the economics of central bank independence. Second, using a principal agent model we design a political economy framework,...

This paper analyzes the pillar of the modern central bank governance – independence – offering three contributions. After a systematic review of the economics of central bank independence, a principal agent model is used to design a political economy framework, which explains how the...

Consider aligning the central bank's objectives closer to the preferences of society and away from those of a non-benevolent government. Although this reform would be socially beneficial and initially succeed in reducing inflation, it would fail to lower inflation permanently. The smaller...

Inflation in advanced economies is low by historical standards but there is no threat of deflation. Slower economic growth is caused by supply-side constraints rather than low inflation. Below-the-target inflation does not damage the reputation of central banks. Thus, central banks should not...