In this paper we consider a two-country New Open Economy Macroeconomics model, and analyze the optimal monetary policy when countries cooperate in the face of a "global liquidity trap"--i.e., a situation where the two countries are simultaneously caught in liquidity traps. The notable features...

This paper considers the optimal degree of monetary-discretion when the central bank conducts policy based on its private information about the state of the economy and is unable to commit. Society seeks to maximize social welfare by imposing restrictions on the central bank's actions over time,...

We estimate monetary policy activism, defined as responsiveness of the policy interest rate to inflation, among five inflation-targeting countries (the UK, Canada, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand) plus the G3 (the US, Japan and Germany) by applying a time-varying parameter with a...

Abandoning an objective function with multiple targets and adopting a single mandate can be an effective way for a central bank to overcome the classic time-inconsistency problem. We show that the choice of a particular single mandate depends on an economy's level of trade openness and the...

Abandoning an objective function with multiple targets and adopting single mandate can be an effective way for a central bank to overcome the classic time-inconsistency problem. We show that the choice of a particular single mandate depends on an economy's level of trade openness and the...