Showing 1 - 10 of 11
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013165419
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365179
We propose a new framework for understanding the effectiveness of central bank announcements when firms have heterogeneous inflation expectations. Expectations are updated through social dynamics and, with heterogeneity, not all firms choose to operate, putting downward pressure on realized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974032
We propose a new framework for understanding the effectiveness of central bank announcements when firms have heterogeneous inflation expectations. Expectations are updated through social dynamics and, with heterogeneity, not all firms choose to operate, putting downward pressure on realized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013053470
We study the implications of the Fed's new policy framework of average inflation targeting (AIT) and its ambiguous communication. We show that AIT improves the trade-off between inflation and real activity by tilting the Phillips curve in a favorable way. To fully utilize this feature and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013213019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012694686
We study the implications of the Fed's new policy framework of average inflation targeting (AIT) and its ambiguous communication. The central bank has the incentive to deviate from its announced AIT and implement inflation targeting ex post to maximize social welfare. We show two motives for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012814448
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946669
We propose a new framework for understanding the effectiveness of central bank announcements when firms have heterogeneous inflation expectations. Expectations are updated through social dynamics and, with heterogeneity, not all firms choose to operate, putting downward pressure on realized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458503
We study the implications of the Fed’s new policy framework of average inflation targeting (AIT) and its ambiguous communication. The central bank has the incentive to deviate from its announced AIT and implement inflation targeting ex post to maximize social welfare. We show two motives for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013308409