Monetary authorities often seem reluctant to discuss the conduct of monetary policy. There is a concern that greater openness in monetary policy-making may lead to volatility in financial markets, and specifically in interest rates. Although there is very little direct empirical evidence...

A literature has grown up around papers by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) which shows how governments have an incentive to inflate the economy (to generate extra output) then the private sector will anticipate this and the economy will stick at a high inflation...

First, we modify the Barro-Gordon model so that a credibility-stabilization tradeoff will remain, even when a performance contract of the type envisaged by Walsh (1995) is imposed on the central bank governor. We do this by modeling a real interest rate bias along with the inflation bias. Then,...

In a New Keynesian macroeconomic model under credible commitment, price level targeting dominates inflation targeting. But with sufficient inflation aversion the inflation-targeting central bank can produce quantitatively similar results to one targeting the price level. The current degree of...