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VALUING OTHERS’ INFORMATION UNDER IMPERFECT EXPECTATIONS
Lindstädt, Hagen - Institut für Angewandte Betriebswirtschaftslehre, … - 2007
Sometimes we believe that others receive harmful information.However, Marschak’s value of information framework … information’s harmfulnessfor oneself. The impact of decision makers’ capabilities to processinformation and of their expectations … maker as a point of reference, this paperintroduces a way for evaluating others’ information from a cross …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009005043
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Interactive Unawareness and Speculative Trade
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2003
The standard state-spaces of asymmetric information preclude non- trivial forms of unawareness (Dekel, Lipman and … standard information structures with strong properties of knowledge. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263088
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Unawareness, Beliefs and Games
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2007
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276586
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Unawareness, beliefs and games
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2007
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276636
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Unawareness, beliefs and games
Heifetz, Aviad (contributor); Meier, Martin (contributor);  … - 2007
-agreeing-to-disagree" theorem. -- unawareness ; type-space ; Bayesian games ; incomplete information ; equilibrium ; common prior ; agreement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003728030
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Unawareness, beliefs and speculative trade
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2009
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We compare unawareness with probability zero belief. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003894997
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Unawareness, beliefs and games
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2007
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365853
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Interactive unawareness
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2005
The standard state-spaces of asymmetric information preclude non-trivial forms of unawareness (Modica and Rustichini …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366550
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Unawareness, Beliefs, and Speculative Trade
Heifetz, Aviad - 2012
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116677
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Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2011
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009544213